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INTRODUCTION
In the summer of 2005, a massive internal displacement took place
in Zimbabwe' under the watchful eye of President Robert Mugabe.2
1. See Press Release, Walter Kilin, Representative of the Secretary-General
on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons, U.N. Representative Calls

Zimbabwe Crisis Massive Internal Displacement (July 29, 2005), http://www.unh
chr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/NewsRoom?OpenFrameSet [hereinafter Kilin Press
Release] (determining, based upon the findings of the U.N. Special Envoy's report,
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With little or no notice,3 the Zimbabwean national police force and
army burned, bulldozed, and demolished tens of thousands of

businesses and homes operating without permits.4 U.N. officials
estimate up to 700,0001 Zimbabwean citizens lost their homes and/or
livelihoods as a result of the slum demolition the Zimbabwean
government termed "Operation Murambatsvina" ("the Operation").6
that the situation in Zimbabwe "comes squarely within the definition of internal
displacement"); see also U.N. Special Envoy on Human Settlements Issues in
Zimbabwe, Report of the Fact-FindingMission to Zimbabwe to Assess the Scope
and Impact of Operation Murambatsvina, 13, delivered to the U.N. SecretaryGeneral (July 18, 2005) [hereinafter UN. Fact-FindingReport] (reporting that the
homes and businesses of hundreds of thousands of Zimbabwe's urban poor were
destroyed as part of the clean-up operation known as Murambatsvina), available at
Zimbabwe
http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/zimbabwe/zimbabwejrpt.pdf;
Human Rights NGO Forum, Order Out of Chaos, or Chaos Out of Order? A
Preliminary Report on Operation "Murambatsvina," 9-11 (June 2005),
http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0001341/Order-ChaosMurambatsvina.pdf
[hereinafter PreliminaryReport] (estimating, conservatively, that after two weeks
the operation produced an internal refugee population of at least 300,000 people
without shelter, sustenance, or, for children, access to schools); Michael Wines,
Zimbabwe Police Resume Drive to Raze Slums, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2005, at A3
(placing the resulting homeless population at closer to 700,000 two months into the
operation and noting that many of the displaced retreated to Zimbabwe's rural
regions, while the police moved others into poorly run government camps).
2. See UN. Fact-Finding Report, supra note 1, at 91 (describing how
President Mugabe justified Operation Murambatsvina to the U.N. Special Envoy
by portraying it as the first step in providing better housing to Zimbabwe's urban
poor). Within days of the campaign's commencement, President Mugabe voiced
his public support for the mass evictions as a means of eradicating criminal and
illicit activity in the capital. Id. at 88. Further, the government provided the
Zimbabwe National Police Force and the Army to facilitate the commission of the
Operation. Id. at 31.
3. See id. at 58 (citing that the residents of the City of Harare received notice
by publication only a few days before the government launched the campaign).
Testimony suggests that outside Harare, where the law requires individual notice,
sometimes "as little as a few hours notice was given, leaving people unable to take
action and resulting in the destruction of property as houses were demolished." Id.
4. See id. at 12 (reporting that the police also ordered inhabitants of targeted
areas to dismantle their own homes and thrashed those who protested).
5. See id. at 7, 31-33 (using data collected by the United Nations Country
Team, reports from special interests groups, information based on field visit
observations, and official statistics provided by the government of Zimbabwe).
6. See Int'l Crisis Group, Zimbabwe's Operation Murambatsvina: The
Tipping Point?, 1 n.1 (Afr. Rep. No. 97, Aug. 17, 2005) (asserting that the
government chose the word Murambatsvina, which literally means "one who
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U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan sent Special Envoy Anna

Tibejukiti to Zimbabwe to report on the scope of the crisis and
present recommendations concerning how to address the
humanitarian problems.' Tibejukiti's report strongly condemns the
forced displacement and suggests that the Zimbabwean government
cannot handle the consequent crisis.8 However, the report stops short
of calling for international intervention or the prosecution of
President Mugabe in the International Criminal Court ("ICC").9 The

report concludes that an international debate about the applicability
of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,'" the

founding treaty resulting in the creation of the ICC, would only
"distract the attention of the international community from focusing
on the humanitarian crisis facing the displaced who need immediate
assistance.""
Despite

the

report's passive

conclusion,

various

countries,

nongovernmental organizations, and legislators from Zimbabwe
argue that the government's actions violated the purpose and
provisions of the Rome Statute.' 2 Zimbabwe is not a party to the
refuses dirt or filth," as a communication urging citizens to rebuff the intrinsic
offensiveness of the informal markets and shantytowns); see also Craig Timberg,
Zimbabwe Police Raze Poor Towns in Rampage, WASH. POST, June 5, 2005, at
A23 (emphasizing that the term "Murambatsvina" translates to "drive out rubbish"
and refers to the overwhelmingly poor citizens targeted by the Operation).
7. See U.N. Fact-FindingReport, supra note 1, at 13-14 (emphasizing that the
mission had the cooperation of the Zimbabwean government, which granted
unimpeded freedom of movement and access to high-ranking individuals).
8. See id. at 71 (blaming the government's overzealous conduct for creating a
state of emergency, disrupting the economy, and exasperating political tension).
The report questions the government's recovery strategy, which envisages
providing plots to victims on land that the military and youth brigades will
develop, and suggests that the government does not have the financial means to
provide food, security, and shelter for the displaced victims. Id. at 48-49.
9. See id. at 67 (recommending that the responsible parties be prosecuted in
Zimbabwean courts and that the government provide compensation to unlawfully
dispossessed citizens).
10. July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (1998) [hereinafter Rome
Statute].
11. UN. Fact-FindingReport, supra note 1, at 66.
12. See, e.g., New Zealand Wants to Drag Mugabe to International Criminal
Court, ZIMONLINE, July 18, 2005, http://www.zimonline.co.za/printme.asp?
ID= 10184 (describing New Zealand's efforts to investigate President Mugabe for
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Rome Statute, 3 and the potential violations occurred within its own
territory and against its own citizens. 4 Therefore, the ICC can only
assert jurisdiction if the U.N. Security Council, acting pursuant to the
6
U.N. Charter, 5 refers the situation to the ICC prosecutor.
This Comment explores the legality of Operation Murambatsvina
and the liability of President Mugabe under the Rome Statute for
committing crimes against humanity. Part I of the Comment
introduces the Operation and the international and domestic laws it
potentially violated. Next, it lays out the relevant provisions of the
Rome Statute and discusses the U.N. Security Council's ability to
refer situations to the ICC for prosecution. Part II argues that
prosecution under the Rome Statute can only proceed if the Council
refers the situation to the ICC under its Chapter VII powers and the
ICC prosecutor makes a case that the Operation violates either
Article 7(d) or 7(k) of the Rome Statute. Part II also contends that
possible crimes against humanity that might fall under the Rome Statute); see also
Lateline (ABC television broadcast July 20, 2005) (transcript available at
http://www.abc.net.au/lateline/content/2005/s 1418870.htm)
(reproducing
an
interview in which David Coultart, spokesperson on justice and legal affairs for the
Zimbabwean Opposition Movement for Democratic Change, insists that the
Operation qualifies as a crime against humanity under the Rome Statue).
13. See Status of Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General,
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, http://untreaty.un.org/
ENGLISH/bible/englishintemetbible/partl/chapterXVIII/treatyll.asp (last visited
Apr. 9, 2006) (recording Zimbabwe's failure to ratify the treaty after signing it);
see also Rome Statute, supra note 10, art. 4 (recognizing the jurisdiction of the
ICC as extending only to those States that ratify the Rome Statute and other States
by special agreement).
14. See U.N. Fact-Finding Report, supra note 1, at 12-13 ("[T]he operation
targeted practically every town and business centre in the country, as well as
countless homes, leaving a trail of destruction in Bulawayo, Chinhoyi, Gweru,
Harare, Kadoma, Kwe Kwe, Marondera, Mutare, Rusape and Victoria Falls.").
15. See U.N. Charter art. 39 (authorizing the Security Council to take any
measures necessary to restore or maintain international peace and security when it
determines that a threat to or breach of that peace and security exists).
16. See Rome Statute, supra note 10, art. 13(b); see also S.C. Res. 1593,
19, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005) (referring the situation in Darfur, Sudan
to the ICC prosecutor and outlining the parameters of the investigation); Int'l
Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, Report to the Secretary-General, 569, U.N.
Doc. S/2005/60 (Jan. 25, 2005) (hereinafter U.N. Report on Darfur]
(recommending a referral to the ICC because the Sudanese judicial system was
incapable of prosecuting the responsible parties).
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involving the ICC is justified because the Zimbabwean government
refuses to hold the responsible parties accountable or to provide a
forum for redress for dispossessed citizens who are guaranteed rights
of action under both international and domestic law. Finally, Part II
maintains that a U.N. Security Council referral to the ICC is also
consistent with both past referrals and current norms addressing
international intervention. Part III recommends, that the ICC
prosecute President Mugabe and that the international community
strongly condemn the Operation to send a message that internal
displacements are an international human rights problem, rather than
a purely domestic issue.

I. BACKGROUND
A. OPERATION MURAMBATSVINA
On May 19, 2005, the Chairperson of the Harare Commission 7
announced that the city of Harare, with the assistance of the
Zimbabwe Republic Police, would demolish all unlicensed
dwellings, marketplaces, and other illegal structures within the city
limits in an effort to stop all forms of illegal activity. 8 Five days
later, the city of Harare issued an enforcement order pursuant to
Section 32 of the Regional, Town and Country Planning Act, 19
stating that demolition of all illegal structures would commence on
June 20, 2005.20 On May 24, police officers and army officials
arrested thousands of citizens, burned and bulldozed homes and

17. See Regional, Town and Country Planning Act, 1976, c. 29:12, § 3-6
(Zimb.) (authorizing the president to establish local governing bodies, like the
Harare Commission, to oversee regional construction and development).
18. See U.N. Fact-FindingReport, supra note 1, at 95 (providing a transcript of
the speech describing the Operation as an effort to stop crime and improve the
deteriorating conditions affecting the city's image).
19. Regional, Town and Country Planning Act § 32(1) (granting the local
planning authority the power to demolish structures operating without lawful
permits).
20. See U.N. Fact-Finding Report, supra note 1, at 96 (reproducing the
published enforcement order, which instructed citizens to demolish all unregulated
outbuildings and shanties used for habitation and business purposes).
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businesses, and forced citizens to destroy their own property. 21 The
military-style campaign began in Harare, but it quickly spread
throughout the country.2 2 The Operation first targeted street vendors
operating in the informal economy and then demolished both formal
and informal housing structures throughout the country.23
Government officials encouraged displaced citizens to return to their
"native" rural homes; however, many citizens could not afford to
travel or simply had no alternative housing.24 As a result, the most
vulnerable citizens 25 were left either to sleep on the streets or to
migrate to overcrowded government-run camps.26
Following the devastation of Operation Murambatsvina, the
government failed to provide the displaced persons with basic
necessities such as food, clothes and shelter.2 7 The international

21. See id. at 12 (reporting that the central police force arrested twenty
thousand vendors within the first week of the Operation); Timberg, supra note 6
(asserting that most people complied with the police and destroyed their homes or
businesses with their own hands or small tools).
22. See U.N. Fact-FindingReport, supra note 1, at 13 (reporting that evictions
began in the urban commercial centers and then extended to more suburban and
residential areas). "More than fifty-two sites were affected and practically no area
designated as 'urban' was spared." Id.
23. See id. at 35-36 (examining the impact of the Operation on workers in the
informal marketplace, both those Who lost their livelihoods directly and on those
that lost legitimate employment because they were forced to relocate).
24. See id. at 13 (finding that most citizens living in major cities no longer
owned their original rural homes); see also PreliminaryReport, supra note 1, at 12
(clarifying the common misconception that the urban poor have migrated from
rural areas and pointing out that foreign nationals displaced by the Operation do
not have a "right of residence in any rural area in Zimbabwe"). Of those citizens
with relatives in rural areas, many could not return home because of the high costs
and shortage of gasoline. Id. at 10.
25. See U.N. Fact-Finding Report, supra note 1, at 39-44 (criticizing the
government for not protecting women, children and people infected with H.I.V.
during and after the evictions).
26. See Michael Wines, Zimbabwe's "Cleanup" Takes a Vast Human Toll,
N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2005, at Al (describing the worsening conditions for the
displaced and homeless Zimbabweans); see also Conditions Worsen for Homeless
Zimbabweans, WASH. POST, Aug. 21, 2005, at A22 (reporting that the government
moved displaced citizens to the outskirts of Harare, where people had only sheets
of plastic and blankets for shelter).
27. See U.N. Fact-FindingReport, supra note 1, at 36-39.
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community strongly condemned the Operation 28 and the media
placed it within the larger context of the breakdown of law and
democracy under President Mugabe. 29 Although the exact motives
behind the Operation remain unclear, ° it adversely affected a broad
cross-section of the population, particularly targeting the poorest and
most helpless members of society.3

28. See id. at 71 (criticizing the government for creating vast human suffering
among its own citizenry, for disregarding the rule of law, and for inflaming
political tensions within the country); PreliminaryReport, supra note 1, at 9-10
(decrying the Zimbabwean government for needlessly creating a human rights
disaster involving the displacement of hundreds of thousands of citizens); see also
Kdilin Press Release, supra note 1 (condemning the government for violating due
process of law and for exacerbating the harmful effects of the crisis). But see
Michael Wines, Around Ruined Zimbabwe, Neighbors Circle Wagons, N.Y. TIMES,
July 6, 2005, at A4 (reporting that the African Union is unwilling to criticize the
actions of the government because it considers the Operation an internal matter).
29. See, e.g., Craig Timberg, Zimbabwean Activists Tell of Beatings, WASH.
POST, Mar. 5, 2005, at A12 (discussing police brutalities against opposition
activists in the months leading up to the 2005 parliamentary elections in
Zimbabwe); see also Craig Timberg, Zimbabwe Shuts Down Independent Weekly,
WASH. POST, Feb. 27, 2005, at A24 [hereinafter Zimbabwe Shuts Down
Independent Weekly] (describing President Mugabe's policy of passing strict media
laws to shut down opposition newspapers); Craig Timberg, Mugabe Said to Use
Law as Political Tool, WASH. POST, July 18, 2004, at A18 [hereinafter Mugabe
Said to Use Law as Political Tool] (reporting on President Mugabe's manipulation
of the criminal justice system to punish his political opponents); Michael Wines,
Zimbabwe to Outlaw Groups that Promote Human Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10,
2004, at A5 (describing President Mugabe's policy of passing strict domestic
legislation to restrict basic freedoms and suppress opposition).
30. See U.N. Fact-FindingReport, supra note 1, at 20-21 (speculating that the
government ordered the demolition of the unregulated homes and businesses to
either gain greater control over the informal economy or to quell an increasingly
restless population upset over record inflation and severe famine).
31. See id. at 33 (stating that the destruction of such a large portion of the
functioning economy indirectly affected the livelihoods of 2.1 million poor and
middle-class people who relied on the informal economy). The Operation left
hundreds of thousands of poverty stricken men, women, children, and H.I.V.positive citizens homeless and without livelihood. Id. at 39-44
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1. Legal Justificationsfor the Operation

The government of Zimbabwe justifies the Operation as legal
under the Regional, Town and Country Planning Act.3" The Act
creates regions, districts, and townships that oversee construction and
provide for the general welfare of society.33 Section 10 of the Act
creates city commissions to oversee and regulate building and
development within the borders of their respective regions.34 The city
commissions have the power to issue permits35 and enforcement
orders requiring the demolition of structures operating without
permits.36 However, enforcement orders do not take effect until one
month after delivery of notice.37 During this reprieve, the resident has
the right to apply for a permit or challenge the findings of the local
commission.38
2. The Zimbabwean Government's Reaction
to the HumanitarianCrisis
President Mugabe consistently ignored questions about the legality
of the Operation and the growing humanitarian crisis.3 9 Although the
32. See PreliminaryReport, supra note 1, at 1-2 (reporting that the government
issued an enforcement order calling for the demolition of the unregulated structures
pursuant to Section 32 of the Act).
33. Regional, Town and Country Planning Act, 1976, c. 29:12, pmbl. (Zimb.)
(calling for the conservation and improvement of the physical environment and the
maintenance of health, order, and general welfare).
34. Id. § 10(1)(a) (indicating that each municipal or town council shall function
as the local planning authority over the area under its jurisdiction).
35. Id. § 26 (setting forth the requirements that a permit application must
satisfy, the procedure by which the local planning authority may refuse an
application, and the appeals process for the rejected applicant).
36. Id. § 32 (recognizing that the local planning commissions have discretion
when determining whether to issue an enforcement order). The local planning
authority may demolish existing regulated developments if the action is necessary
to conform to a local building plan or if it appears expedient in the interests of the
planning of the area. Id. § 35.
37. Id. § 32(3). The Act deems publication of the enforcement order in a
newspaper to be sufficient notice when the enforcement order affects a substantial
number of people. Id. § 32(6).

38. Id. § 31.
39. See U.N. Fact-FindingReport, supra note 1, at 88 (reporting that President
Mugabe supports the Operation and described settlements in Harare as "a mess"
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government launched a rebuilding project called "Operation
Garikai,"40 the United Nations had serious concerns about the
viability of the plan and ultimately concluded that the government
could not handle the humanitarian crisis.4
B. POTENTIAL VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL
OBLIGATIONS AND DOMESTIC LAWS
Operation Murambatsvina potentially conflicts with numerous
domestic laws and international covenants signed and ratified by
Zimbabwe, including the Zimbabwean Constitution,4 2 the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights,43 the International Covenant on
Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights ("ICESCR"),4 4 the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR"), 55
and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights.4 6

Specifically, Operation Murambatsvina potentially violated several
provisions within the Constitution of Zimbabwe and international
covenants, such as the right to human dignity,4 7 the right to housing

from which new businesses should emerge). President Mugabe received the U.N.
mission in an effort to convince the Secretary-General of the righteousness of the
Operation. Id. at 91.
40. See id. at 47-48 (describing the government's plan to provide displaced
citizens with plots of land to rebuild their homes and businesses).
41. See id. at 48-50 (concluding that Operation Garikai is a disingenuous plan
that does not effectively address the developing humanitarian crisis).
42. See ZIMB. CONST. §§ 13, 15-16.
43. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948).
44. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, G.A.
Res. 2200, at 49, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec.
16, 1966) [hereinafter ICESCR].
45. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, at 52,
U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966)
[hereinafter ICCPR].
46. African Charter on Human and People's Rights, adopted June 27, 1981,
O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982) [hereinafter
African Charter].
47. See ZIMB. CONST. § 15 (protecting against inhumane and degrading
treatment); African Charter, supra note 46, art. 4, 21 I.L.M. at 60 (pledging respect
for the integrity of every person); id. art. 5, 21 I.L.M. at 60 (safeguarding every
person's inherent dignity); id. art. 24, 21 I.L.M. at 63 (recognizing the right to a
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and employment, 48 the right to freedom of movement, 49 and the right

to due process before the taking of property. 0
The Human Rights Committee ("HRC") and the Committee on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights ("CESCR") enforce the
ICCPR and ICESCR by issuing reports evaluating States parties'
efforts to carry out the Covenants' provisions." The Committees
have written influential General Comments supporting the view that
forced displacements are prima facie unlawful and "can only be
justified in the most exceptional of circumstances." 52 Moreover, the
Committees have determined that States parties must respect the

satisfactory environment beneficial to development). The Zimbabwean
government violated its citizens' constitutional rights to personal liberty and
protection from inhumane treatment when it ruthlessly demolished their homes and
businesses. See ZIMB. CONST. §§ 13, 15.
48. See ICCPR, supra note 45, art. 17 (prohibiting arbitrary interference with a
person's home or family); ICESCR, supra note 44, art. 6 (recognizing the right to
work and the duty of the government to safeguard its citizens' livelihood);
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 43, art. 23 (protecting the right
to work and the right to choose employment); see also id. art. 25 (guarding the
right to a reasonable standard of living including access to food, clothing, housing,
medical care, and social services).
49. See ZIMB. CONST. § 22 (setting forth the right to freedom of movement,
which the Zimbabwean government violated by forcing its citizens to return to
rural areas or onto government-run camps); ICCPR, supra note 45, art. 12
(recognizing a person's right to move freely and choose a personal residence).
50. See ZIMB. CONST. § 16(1)(b) (guarding citizens' right to property by
requiring authorities to provide reasonable notice of their intention to acquire such
property); African Charter, supra note 46, art. 14, 21 I.L.M. at 61 (guaranteeing
that the right to property shall not be disturbed except according to appropriate
laws based upon the public need); ICCPR, supra note 45, art. 9 (forbidding
deprivation of liberty without established procedures of law); Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 43, art. 17 (protecting against arbitrary
deprivation of property).
51. See ICCPR, supra note 45, art. 40(4) (providing that both committees may
study the reports and issue comments to States parties); see also ICESCR, supra
note 44, art. 21 (instructing the Committee to evaluate the reports and pass their
findings along to other agencies within the United Nations).
52. U.N. Eco. & Soc. Council [ESCOC], Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural
18, U.N. Doc.
Rts., General Comment 4: The Right to Adequate Housing,
E/1992/23 (1991), reprinted in Compilation of General Comments and General
Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, 48, U.N. Doc
HRI/Gen/1 (Sept. 4, 1992) [hereinafter General Comment 4].
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Covenants' incorporation clauses and provisions instructing States to
provide redress to citizens who claim a violation of the Covenants.5 3
Operation Murambatsvina may also conflict with soft international
law.14 For example, although not binding, the Guiding Principles on
Internal Displacement provide a framework for determining when
displacement of a population is lawful and for protecting populations
from forced displacement.55 The Guiding Principles also guarantee
due process of law and adequate government care after
displacement.56
C. SECURITY COUNCIL REFERRAL PURSUANT TO
ITS CHAPTER VII POWERS
The U.N.

Security Council is the main body charged with

preventing the disruption of international peace and security. The
scope of this duty has expanded to cover traditionally domestic
situations where civilians suffer severe human rights violations.
53. See ICCPR, supra note 45, art. 2(3)(a)-(c) (declaring that States parties
must establish competent judicial or administrative bodies to hear claims of
violations of the Covenant); c.f African Charter, supra note 46, art. 26, 21 I.L.M.
at 63 (calling for the establishment of national institutions to promote and protect
the charter-based rights and freedoms).
54. See generally Dinah Shelton, Introduction to COMMITMENT AND
COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
SYSTEM 2 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000) (defining "soft law" as "international nonbinding norms").
55. ESCOC, Comm'n on Hum. Rts., Guiding Principles on Internal
Displacement, Addendum to the Report of the Representative of the SecretaryGeneral,Submitted Pursuantto Commission Resolution 1997/39, princs. 6, 8, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 (Feb. 11, 1998) [hereinafter Guiding Principles]
(protecting citizens from arbitrary displacement of their habitual residences and
stating that displacement should not violate the security, liberty, or dignity of the
affected population).
56. Id. princ. 7(1) (stating that governments must explore all possible
alternatives prior to displacement and must provide proper accommodations to
citizens if displacements occur); id. princ. 7(3)(b) (recognizing that governments
should fully inform their citizens prior to displacement and attempt to gain. their
consent before taking any action).
.57. See U.N. Charter art. 24, 1.
58. See, e.g., U.N. Report on Darfur, supra note 16, at 162 (recommending
U.N. Security Council intervention even though the internal conflict involved
Sudanese victims and Sudanese combatants).
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The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
reported on the expanding role of international intervention in its
report, The Responsibility to Protect.59 The report concludes that
sovereign nations have the primary responsibility to protect their
people. 60 However, the report also advocates international
intervention when a population suffers harm and the sovereign nation
is unwilling or unable to stop the harm. 61 According to the report, the
responsibility to protect encompasses three responsibilities: to
prevent, 62 to react, 63 and to rebuild.64

In 2005, the Security Council acted under its Chapter VII powers

65
to refer the situation in Darfur, Sudan, to the prosecutor of the ICC.

Prior to the resolution, a commission established by the U.N.
Security Council determined that the government and militias killed,
tortured, raped, and forcibly displaced civilians throughout Darfur.66
The Commission recommended referral to the ICC because the
continuing violence constituted a threat to international peace and
59. See generally INT'L

COMM'N ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY,

1.37-1.38 (2001), http://www.iciss.ca/pdf/
Commision-Report.pdf [hereinafter RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT] (endorsing the
broadening scope of international intervention); The Secretary-General, Report of
the Secretary-General,In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security, and
Human Rights for All,
135, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc.
A/59/2005 (Mar. 21, 2005) [hereinafter Report of the Secretary-General] (calling
for international intervention when a sovereign State fails to protect its citizens).
60. RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, supra note 59, 2.27 (recognizing that States
must protect their citizens from threats against life, health, livelihood, and personal
dignity).
THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT,

61. Id. 1.35.
62. Id. at xi (acknowledging that the international community must address
both the root and direct causes of the internal conflict).
63. Id. (stating that the international community must respond to human
suffering with appropriate measures like sanctions, international prosecution, or
military intervention).
64. Id. (determining that the international community must provide assistance
with recovery following military intervention by addressing the causes that led to
the intervention).
65. See generally S.C. Res. 1593, supra note 16, pmbl. (determining that the
situation in Darfur constituted a threat to international peace and security).
66. U.N. Report on Darfur, supra note 16, at 3 (reporting that widespread
violations of international law caused immeasurable suffering and loss of
livelihood throughout the region).
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security67 and the Sudanese judicial system was unable to ensure
accountability or end the violence.68
D. CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY UNDER THE ROME STATUTE

Under the Rome Statute, a crime only reaches the level of a "crime
against humanity" if it meets the criteria set forth in the chapeau to
Article 7 and falls within the specific crimes listed in Article 7(1).69
Specifically, the chapeau" requires that an act be a widespread 71 or
systematic 72 attack 73 against a civilian population, 74 and that the
perpetrator have knowledge of the attack.75 In other words, the
chapeau requires that a perpetrator, in knowing furtherance of a State
67. Id. at 5.
68. Id. at 145.
69. Rome Statute, supra note 10, art. 7(1) (listing "forcible transfer of
population" and "other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing
great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health" as
specific violations that may constitute crimes against humanity). See generally
Darryl Robinson, Defining "Crimes Against Humanity" at the Rome Conference,
93 AM. J. INT'L L. 43, 47 (1999) (explaining that the chapeau necessarily sets a
high threshold for the definition of a crime against humanity).
70. See Rome Statute, supra note 10, art. 7(1).
71. See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment, 580 (Sept.
2, 1998) (defining a "widespread attack" as a "massive, frequent, large scale
action, carried out collectively with considerable seriousness and directed against a
multiplicity of victims").
72. See id. (finding that "systematic" means "thoroughly organized and
following a regular pattern on the basis of a common policy involving substantial
public or private resources").
73. See Antonio Cassese, Crimes Against Humanity, in 1 THE ROME STATUTE
OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 353, 356-57 (Antonio
Cassese et al. eds., 2002) (acknowledging that an "attack" must involve a largescale action, a substantial number of victims, and a high degree of planning or
orchestration, rather than "isolated or sporadic misbehavior, however heinous and
revolting," in order to qualify as a crime against humanity).
74. See Robinson, supra note 69, at 51 (maintaining that the negotiators chose
the term "civilian population" to protect both nationals and aliens from crimes
against humanity).
75. See Cassese, supra note 73, at 373 (identifying the necessary mens rea as
an awareness that a specific criminal act is part of a larger widespread or
systematic attack on a civilian population); see also Robinson, supra note 69, at
51-52 (asserting that to satisfy the necessary mens rea the accused must only be
aware of the larger attack but need not actually orchestrate it).
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policy, carries out multiple commissions of an act referred to in
Article 7(1) against a civilian population. In addition, Article 7(l)(d)
lists "deportation or forcible transfer of a population" as a specific
act that could constitute a crime against humanity 76 and Article
7(2)(d) defines this act as the forced 77 displacement of the persons
concerned by expulsion or other coercive acts from the area in which
they are lawfully present, without grounds permitted under
international law. 8

Finally, Article 7(l)(k) lists "[o]ther inhumane acts of a similar
character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to
body or to mental or to physical health" as a specific act that could
also constitute a crime against humanity.79 Commentators note that
this provision allows the prosecution of heinous crimes that do not
fall within the definitions laid out in Article 7(1).80

76. Rome Statute, supra note 10, art. 7(1)(d); see also MACHTELD BOOT,
GENOCIDE, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, WAR CRIMES: NULLUM CRIMEN SINE AND
THE SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT

503 (2002) (differentiating "forcible transfer," which encompasses a large-scale
movement of a population within a country, from "deportation").
77. See Preparatory Comm'n for the Int'l Crim. Ct., Addendum: Part 11,
Finalized Draft Text of the Elements of Crimes, art. 7(1)(d) n.12, U.N. Doc.
PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2 (Nov. 2, 2000) (adding the important caveat that force is
not limited to actual physical force); see also BOOT, supra note 76, at 504
(emphasizing that the threat of force may constitute forcible transfer of a
population).
78. Rome Statute, supra note 10, art. 7(2)(d); see also Darryl Robinson, The
Elements of Crimes Against Humanity, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT:
ELEMENTS OF CRIMES AND RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE 57, 86 (Roy S.

Lee ed., 2001) (acknowledging that cautious delegates created a stringent
definition for "deportation or forcible transfer" because States are permitted to
carry out legitimate and lawful internal transfers).
79. Rome Statute, supra note 10, art. 7(l)(k).
80. See, e.g., Kelly D. Askin, Crimes Within the Jurisdiction of the
InternationalCriminal Court, 10 CRIM. L.F. 33, 49 (1999) (arguing that this serves
as a catch-all provision granting jurisdiction over individuals whose crimes against
humanity were "unforeseen or unspecified").

828

AM. U. INT'L L. REV.

[21:813

1. JurisdictionalLimits of the Rome Statute
The Rome Statute grants jurisdictional power to the ICC over
individuals81 who commit the most serious crimes concerning the
welfare of the international community.8 2 Specifically, it establishes
jurisdiction over the crime of genocide, war crimes, crimes against
83
humanity, and the crime of aggression.
The ICC has jurisdiction over nationals from countries who
ratified the Rome Statute if the individual directly commits a crime,
commits a crime through another person, or orders or solicits the
commission of a crime.84 The ICC may also exercise jurisdiction if a
non-member State's national commits a prosecutable crime in a
member State's territory or commits the crime against a national
from a member State. 85 Although the Rome Statute recognizes the
primacy of national governments, it grants the ICC complementary
jurisdiction;8 6 therefore, judges can determine a case is inadmissible
if the State with jurisdiction over the crime is genuinely prosecuting
87
or carrying out an investigation.
The U.N. Security Council can also confer to the ICC jurisdiction
over non-member States, such as' Zimbabwe, by referring the
situation to the ICC prosecutor for investigation or prosecution.88 In
this instance, the U.N. Security Council could initiate an
investigation through the Secretary General,8 9 review the resulting

81. Rome Statute, supra note 10, art. 25(1) (asserting jurisdiction over natural
persons, not States).
82. See id. pmbl. (providing for prosecution of crimes that affect peace,
security, and well-being).
83. Id. art. 5.
84. Id. art. 25.
85. Id. art. 12.
86. See id. pmbl.
87. See id. art. 17.
88. See id. art. 13. See generally Preparatory Comm'n for the Int'l Crim. Ct.,
Addendum: Part , Draft Relationship Agreement Between the Court and the
UnitedNations, arts. 2-20, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2001/1/Add. 1 (Jan. 8, 2002).
89. Cf S.C. Res. 1564,
12, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1564 (Sept. '18, 2004)
(demanding an immediate investigation into claims of -genocide and breaches of
international law by the Sudanese government in Darfur).

2006]

OPERA TION MURAMBA TSVINA

829

report, and decide whether the act constitutes a threat to international
peace and security. 90
2. Statutory Interpretationand Application ofLaw
Under the Rome Statute
The Rome Statute requires strict interpretation of the definitions of
crimes. 91 If ambiguity exists, the ICC must construe definitions in
favor of the charged party. 92 When interpreting a provision, the ICC
must first apply the Statute itself, the elements of crimes, and its
rules of procedure and evidence. 93 If appropriate, the judges may
secondarily apply "applicable treaties and the principles and rules of
international law." 94 If neither of these first two sources provides
clarity, the ICC may apply general legal principles derived from
national legal systems, including the national law of the State with
jurisdiction, as long as that law is consistent with internationally
recognized standards and the Rome Statute. 95 The ICC must apply
and interpret law pursuant to this provision consistently with
internationally recognized human rights. 96

90. Cf S.C. Res. 1593, supra note 16, 1 (deciding that the situation in Darfur
merited referral to the ICC prosecutor under the U.N. Security Council's Chapter
VII powers).
91. Rome Statute, supra note 10, art. 22(2).
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id.
Id. art. 21(1)(a).
Id. art. 21(l)(b).
Id. art. 21(1)(c).
See id. art. 21(3) (protecting against "any adverse distinction founded on

grounds such as gender as defined in article 7, paragraph 3, age, race, colour,
language, religion or belief, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social
origin, wealth, birth or other status").
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II. ANALYSIS
A. THE ZIMBABWEAN GOVERNMENT VIOLATED DOMESTIC
LAW, INTERNATIONAL TREATIES, AND THE GUIDING
PRINCIPLES ON INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT
The Zimbabwean government violated the Regional, Town and
Country Planning Act by giving zero to three days notice to its
citizens before demolishing their homes and businesses. 97 The short
to nonexistent time span between notice and demolition further

deprived citizens of their right to petition the decision or to apply for
a permit. 98 This fundamental denial of due process also violated the
Zimbabwe Constitution.9 9 In addition to the gross violations of due

process, the government exceeded the scope of the Regional, Town
and Country Planning Act by bypassing local planning authorities

and carrying out the Operation with the aid of the central police force
and the army. 00
The

Zimbabwean

government

also

violated

numerous

international covenants and the Guiding Principles on Internal
Displacement. The Zimbabwean government violated numerous
treaties protecting individuals' rights to choose their own
employment and obtain a reasonable standard of living by destroying
the livelihoods of over 700,000 men, women, and children. 0

1

The

97. See Regional, Town and Country Planning Act, 1976, c. 29:12, § 32(3)
(Zimb.) (stating that the local planning authority must wait at least thirty days after
giving notice to demolish unregulated structures).
98. See id. § 38(1) (guaranteeing all citizens a right to appeal the local planning
authority's decision and apply for a permit within one month of receiving notice).
99. See ZIMB. CONST. § 16 (protecting citizens from deprivation of property
without due process of law).
100. See Regional, Town and Country Planning Act § 35 (granting local
planning authorities jurisdiction* over regulating permits and carrying out
enforcement orders).
101. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 43, art. 23(1)
(preventing governments from infringing upon their citizens' right to work or
choose their own employment); id. art. 25(1) (recognizing the right to a reasonable
standard of living, including access to adequate housing); see also ICESCR, supra
note 44, art. 6 (protecting the right to work and obtain a reasonable living). Article
6 also sets forth parties' obligation to take steps toward providing their citizens
with vocational training. Id. See generally African Charter, supra note 46, art. 24,
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government not only crushed their livelihoods, but it also thrust the
victims into a desperate fight for survival that violates an obligation
to respect human dignity.10 2 The lack of planning 03 for the inevitable
humanitarian crisis 04 demonstrates that the architects failed to
meaningfully consider the possible alternatives to the mass
demolition and did not secure alternative accommodations for
displaced citizens.105 Instead of creating a reasonable and effective
humanitarian plan, the government likely violated its citizens' right
to freedom of movement by requiring them to return to their native
land or move to overcrowded and under-resourced government

camps.
B. THE ZIMBABWEAN GOVERNMENT MUST PROSECUTE
INDIVIDUALS WHO VIOLATED DOMESTIC LAW AND
PROVIDE A FORUM FOR REDRESS FOR INDIVIDUALS
DEPRIVED OF THEIR RIGHTS

The government of Zimbabwe has a legal duty to investigate
whether the architects of the Operation or those who carried it out
deprived citizens of their Constitutional right to protection from
inhumane treatment.10 6 The government of Zimbabwe must also
21 I.L.M. at 63
development).

(guaranteeing

all Africans an

environment beneficial to

102. See African Charter, supra note 46, art. 5, 21 I.L.M. at 60 (recognizing the
inherent dignity of every individual); ICCPR, supra note 45, pmbl. (establishing
human dignity as the source of all human rights).
103. See U.N. Fact-FindingReport, supra note 1, at 47-48 (questioning whether
the government's restoration efforts will be able to succeed given Zimbabwe's
hyperinflation and chronic budget deficits); see also Wines, supra note 26
(criticizing the government's policy of forcing the displaced citizens into run-down
camps and disingenuously promising permanent housing later).
104. See U.N. Fact-FindingReport, supra note 1, at 36-46.
105. See Guiding Principles, supra note 55, princ. 7 (instructing States to
consider all possible alternatives to forced displacement and to provide citizens
with adequate resources if displacement does occur).
106. See ZIMB. CONST. § 15 (protecting citizens from inhumane, degrading, or
other such treatment); see also U.N. Fact-FindingReport, supra note 1, at 76-78
(suggesting that the potential negligence of the police officers, coupled with the
commencement of the Operation during winter, intensified the vast human
suffering); Conditions Worsen for Homeless Zimbabweans, supra note 26
(discussing the existence of inhumane conditions at government-run displacement
camps).
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provide a forum where citizens can seek redress for violations of
domestic law because both the Zimbabwe Constitution and the
Regional, Town and Country Planning Act contain provisions
establishing rights of action for violations of their terms. 07 In
particular, the government must provide a forum for redress for
citizens claiming due process violations 08 and for citizens
dispossessed despite holding lawful title to land. 09
The government of Zimbabwe cannot invoke its domestic law to
justify violations of its international treaty obligations because the
African Charter, the ICECSR, and the ICCPR contain provisions
requiring states to incorporate their terms into domestic lgislation.I"
Further, the Zimbabwean government cannot deny citizens a forum
of redress for violations of treaty-based rights because the African
Charter and the ICCPR contain provisions calling for establishment

107. See ZIMB. CONST. § 24; Regional, Town and Country Planning Act, 1976,
c. 29:12, § 38 (Zimb.).
108. See Regional, Town and Country Planning Act § 38(1) (establishing a
mandatory appeals process for any person aggrieved by a local planning authority
decision); see also ZIMB. CONST. § 24 (providing a right of action for citizens
claiming a violation of their constitutional rights).
109. See ZIMB. CONST. § 16 (stating that the government cannot acquire
property without supplying reasonable notice and protecting citizens from the
arbitrary deprivation of property); see also U.N. Fact-FindingReport, supra note
1, at 58-59 (citing evidence that the government destroyed numerous homes and
businesses that held valid permits during Operation Murambatsvina).
I10. See African Charter, supra note 46, art. 1, 21 I.L.M. at 60; ICCPR, supra
note 45, art. 2(2); ICESCR, supra note 44, art. 2(1); Hum. Rts. Comm., General
Comment 31: The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States
Parties to the Covenant, 13, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.I/Add.13 (May 26,
2004) [hereinafter General Comment 31] (recognizing that States party to the
ICCPR must amend and interpret their domestic law in conformity with their
Covenant obligations); see also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 27,
May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 339 [hereinafter Vienna Convention] ("A party
may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to
perform a treaty."). See generally ESCOC, Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts.,
General Comment 7: The Right to Adequate Housing,
10, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/1997/4 (1997), reprinted in Compilation of General Comments and
General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, 48, U.N.
Doc HRI/GEN/1/Rev.3 (Aug. 15, 1997) [hereinafter General Comment 7] (calling
for the amendment of domestic legislation that is inconsistent with the right to
adequate housing).
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of domestic institutions to hear such claims.'11 The Government of
Zimbabwe is likely to argue that its Constitution explicitly rejects
112
automatic incorporation of international treaties into domestic law.
However, the text of the Covenants" 3 and influential General
Comments1 4 weaken that position. In fact, the Zimbabwean
Constitution protects rights guaranteed in the Covenants.I 5 For these
reasons, the Zimbabwean government has a duty to protect covenantbased rights incorporated into Zimbabwean law and those guaranteed
by domestic law; in order to fulfill this duty, it must make a good
faith effort'1 6 to provide-redress for violations of the Zimbabwean
Constitution, 17 the Regional, Town and Country Planning Act,' 18 the
121
12 °
ICCPR, 119 the ICESCR, and the African Charter.

111. African Charter, supra note 46, art. 26, 21 I.L.M. at 63; ICCPR, supra note
45, art. 2(3).
112. See ZIMB. CONST. § 111 B (subjecting international agreements
parliamentary approval prior to their incorporation into domestic law).

to

113. See supra notes 110-111 and accompanying text (discussing the treaty
provisions calling for domestic incorporation of the terms of the treaty).
114. See, e.g., ESCOC, Comm. on Econ, Soc. & Cultural Rts., General
Comment 9: The Domestic Application of the Covenant,
11, U.N. Doc.
E/C. 12/1998/24 (Dec. 3, 1998) [hereinafter General Comment 9] (emphasizing that
there should be no a prioriassumption that the ICESCR is not self-executing).
115. See ZIMB. CONST. §§ 15-16, 22 (protecting Zimbabwean citizens from
inhuman treatment, deprivation of property, and infringement upon freedom of
movement).
116. See Vienna Convention, supra note 110, art. 26, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 339
(declaring that all States parties to a treaty must perform in good faith).
117. See ZIMB. CONST. § 24.
118. See Regional, Town and Country Planning Act, 1976, c. 29:12, § 38
(Zimb.).
119. See ICCPR, supra note 45, art. 2(3) (requiring effective judicial,
administrative, or legislative remedies for violations of the treaty); see also
General Comment 31, supra note 110,
7 (recognizing that a State's obligation
includes providing effective remedy for breaches of the Covenant).
120. See ICESCR, supra note 44, art. 2(1) (calling for the protection of the
treaty rights by all appropriate means, including the adoption of domestic
legislation); see also General Comment 9, supra note 114,
2 (requiring a
mechanism for ensuring government accountability and providing a means for
legal redress); General Comment 7, supra note 110, 9 (calling for the punishment
of persons or public bodies that negligently carry out forced evictions). See
generally Universal Declaration on Human Rights, supra note 43, art. 8 (stating
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C. THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD REFER THE SITUATION
IN ZIMBABWE TO THE ICC PROSECUTOR BECAUSE THE
ZIMBABWEAN GOVERNMENT REFUSES TO PROTECT ITS
CITIZENS' LEGAL AND HUMANITARIAN RIGHTS

Despite having a duty to act under domestic and international law,
the Zimbabwean government refuses to meaningfully address the
legal and humanitarian consequences of the Operation.122 In reality,
the government most likely will not provide its citizens with legal
redress or investigate potential criminal activity because any
admission of guilt would likely lead to further inquiries implicating
high-ranking government officials, including the President himself. 23
Further, the government can effectively suppress any independent
calls for investigation because the President exerts tight control over
the media, 24 human rights groups,125 and the three branches of the
government.1 26 Because the government will not defend its citizens'
that national tribunals must provide effective remedies for violations of
domestically ensured rights).
121. See African Charter, supra note 46, art. 26, 21 I.L.M. at 63 (calling for the
establishment of appropriate national institutions that promote and protect the
charter-based rights and freedoms).
122. See U.N. Fact-FindingReport, supra note 1, at 88 (reporting that President
Mugabe supports the Operation and envisions a new environment rising up from
the destruction). President Mugabe agreed to the U.N. fact-finding mission to show
the Secretary-General that the Operation provides a better future for his people. Id.
at 91. In addition, the police commissioner lent his support to the Operation by
stating it will clean the "crawling mass of maggots bent on destroying the
economy". Id. at 88.
123. See Int'l Crisis Group, supra note 6, at 6 (reasoning that President Mugabe
must have at least known about, or perhaps even planned, the nation-wide
government operation).
124. See Zimbabwe Shuts Down Independent Weekly, supra note 29 (reporting
on the strict media laws that allow President Mugabe to arbitrarily shut down
independent newspapers and maintain control over the daily newspapers,
television, and radio).
125. See Wines, supra note 29 (describing Zimbabwean Parliament-approved
legislation that bans foreign-controlled nongovernmental organizations).
126. See Mugabe Said to Use Law as Political Tool, supra note 29 (reporting
that President Mugabe carries out his political objectives through the criminal
justice system); see also Craig Timberg, Mugabe Gains Expanded Powers, WASH.
POST, Aug. 31, 2005, at A20 (commenting on President Mugabe's expanded
constitutional powers allowing him to restrict travel by opposition leaders, limit the
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legal and humanitarian rights, the international community should
collectively intervene for the sake of Zimbabwe's population.127
Specifically, the U.N. Security Council should investigate the
situation and determine whether the Operation constitutes a crime
against humanity under the Rome Statute. 128 The U.N. Security
Council can refer the situation to the ICC under its Chapter VII
powers because the Zimbabwean government's disregard for the rule
of law and its complete abandonment of humanitarian responsibility
constitutes a threat to peace and security in the region. 129 This type of
collective intervention in traditionally domestic situations conforms
to the emerging principle that the international community must
protect the security of the world's citizens when sovereign
governments refuse to do so. 30
U.N. Security Council referral to the ICC prosecutor of the
situation in Zimbabwe is consistent with the referral of the situation
in Darfur to the ICC prosecutor. 3 ' Although the situation in Darfur
32
was admittedly on a different scale than Operation Murambatsvina,
right of appeal in instances of government-sponsored land seizures, and appoint
loyal supporters to a newly created sixty-five member senate).
127. See RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, supra note 59, at 8 (recognizing that the
international community must protect citizens from breaches of human rights law
if the sovereign nation is unwilling to deal with the violations); see also Report of
the Secretary-General, supra note 59,
135 (endorsing the idea that the
international community is collectively responsible for preventing and intervening
in humanitarian crises).
128. See U.N. Fact-FindingReport, supra note 1, at 64 (recognizing that a broad
coalition of politicians, church leaders, academics, and concerned civilians argue
that the Operation falls under the jurisdiction of the Rome Statute).
129. Cf S.C. Res. 733, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/733 (1992) (stressing that the
internal conflict in Somalia constituted a threat to international peace and security);
U.N. Report on Darfur, supra note 16, at 5 (reiterating that the Security Council
determined that the internal conflict in Darfur constituted a threat to international
peace and security).
130. See RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, supra note 59, 2.22 (acknowledging
that human security comprises security against threats to life, health, livelihood,
personal safety, and human dignity).
131. See S.C. Res. 1593, supra note 16,
1-2 (referring the situation in Darfur,
Sudan to the ICC prosecutor and demanding the full cooperation of the parties to
the conflict in the investigation).
132. See U.N. Report on Darfur,supra note 16, at 3 (describing the widespread
and reprehensible violations of international law in Darfur, including murder, rape,
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the U.N. Security Council considered both the scope of the crisis and
133
the inability of the government to stop or remedy the situation.
Therefore, U.N. Security Council referral is justified because of the
large scope of the problem in Zimbabwe and the government's
unwillingness and inability to protect its citizens' human rights.
U.N. Security Council referral134 also fulfills the three elements
comprising the responsibility to protect.'35 First, referral to the ICC
would help prevent further harm by exposing the cause of the
36
problem, President Mugabe, to liability under the Rome Statute.
Second, referral to the ICC prosecutor would be a sufficient reaction
incorporating the need to take proportionate punitive measures
against the responsible parties.'37 Finally, referring the situation to
the ICC prosecutor addresses the root of the harm and the primary
impediment to rebuilding, allowing the U.N. Security Council to
fulfill its duty to rebuild.'38

and mass forced displacement); see also Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Keynote Address:
Integratingthe Work of the ICC into Local Justice Initiatives, 21 AM. U. INT'L L.
REV. 497, 498 (2006) (referring to the gravity of the harm as a justification for
pursuing the situation in Darfur).
133. See U.N. Report on Darfur, supra note 16, 569 (recommending that the
U.N. Security Council refer the situation because the Sudanese government could
not protect its own citizens).
134. See 1 M. CHRIF BASSIOUNI, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 140 (2005) (stating that the U.N. Security
Council's referral power is based on universal jurisdiction but that it is unclear
whether a referral requires the prosecutor to indict or simply to investigate the
claim).
135. See RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, supra note 59, at xi (stating that the
responsibility to protect includes the responsibility to prevent, the responsibility to
react, and the responsibility to rebuild).
136. But see BASSIOUNI, supra note 134, at 131 (pointing out that the U.N.
Security Council can only refer a situation, not a particular person, to the ICC for
investigation).
137. See RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, supra note 59, at xi (recognizing that the
responsibility to react includes asserting appropriate measures including sanctions
or international prosecution).
138. See id. (asserting that the responsibility to rebuild includes addressing the
cause of harm that led to the intervention).
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D. THE NARROW LANGUAGE OF ARTICLE 7(1)(D) OF THE
ROME STATUTE MAKES PROSECUTION OF PRESIDENT
MUGABE POSSIBLE BUT DIFFICULT

The Operation likely falls within the chapeau of crimes against
humanity. 39 Operation Murambatsvina fulfills the widespread
requirement because over 700,000 citizens lost their homes or
businesses and an estimated 2.1 million civilians were affected to
some degree.1 40 Additionally, the Operation satisfies the systematic
element of the chapeau because the government, in an act of official
State policy, recklessly and without warning demolished tens of
thousands of personal structures and forced the occupants to return to
1
4
their "native lands."'1

Although the Operation satisfies the requirements of the chapeau,
it is unlikely that it falls within the definition of forcible transfer of a
population as defined by Article 7(1)(d). 142 While authorities forcibly
transferred the citizens by expulsion and other coercive acts 143
without grounds permitted under international law,'" many of the
dispossessed civilians were not lawfully on the premises within the
139. See Rome Statute, supra note 10, art. 7(1).
140. See Cassese, supra note 73, at 361 (arguing that one must establish if an act
is an isolated event or part of a larger pattern of violence to determine if it is
widespread or systematic); see also discussion supra Part L.A (detailing the scope
of Operation Murambatsvina and quantifying its effect on the Zimbabwean
population).
141. See Machteld Boot et al., Crimes Against Humanity, in COMMENTARY ON
THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 117, 127 (Otto
Triffterer ed., 1999) (recognizing that the attack must occur pursuant to, or in
furtherance of, a State or organizational policy). The state action component
eliminates isolated acts from crimes against humanity. Id.; see also discussion
supra Part L.A (explaining the nature of the Operation and the process by which it
spread across the country).
142. See Rome Statute, supra note 10, art. 7(l)(d).
143. See Preparatory Comm'n for the Int'l Crim. Ct., supra note 77, art. 7(1)(d)
n. 12 (explaining that the concept of "forcible" is not limited to physical force and
may include the threat of force or coercion); see also BOOT, supra note 76, at 504
(emphasizing that the threat of force may constitute forcible transfer of a
population).
144. See, e.g., General Comment 4, supra note 52, 18 (recognizing that forced
evictions are fundamentally incompatible with international law and are only
justified in exceptional circumstances).
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meaning of the statute. 145 Most citizens did not have lawful permits
because the informal market comprised over forty percent of the total
economy. 14 6 Therefore, prosecution under the Rome Statute will -be
difficult because the strict interpretation of the words "lawfully on
in wording would be
the premises" is required and any ambiguity
47
Mugabe.1
President
construed in favor of
If the ICC determines that Operation Murambatsvina constitutes a
crime against humanity under the Rome Statute, it can likely hold
President Mugabe accountable for his role in the Operation.
Although the Special Envoy cautiously concludes that unnamed
lower-level government officials provided the advice that led to the
Operation,'48 logic dictates that authorization for a nationwide
operation involving the national police and the military would have
come from President Mugabe himself' 49 President Mugabe's
probable knowledge of the crime and its predictable effect of
contributing to a widespread systematic attack on the Zimbabwean
citizens further satisfies the mens rea requirement.Y0 Moreover, even
145. See Rome Statute, supra note 10, art. 7(2)(d) (stating that the displaced
persons must be lawfully on the premises to satisfy the elements of forced
eviction).
146. See U.N. Fact-FindingReport, supra note 1, at 17 (recognizing that the
majority of Zimbabweans relied on the informal economy). The unregulated sector
employed up to four million people and supported another five million individuals,
whereas the formal economy only employed about one and a half million citizens.
Id.; see also Preliminary Report, supra note 1, at 7-8 (suggesting that the
government tacitly and even explicitly encouraged the growth of the informal
sector).
147. See Rome Statute, supra note 11, art. 22 (calling for the strict interpretation
of crimes with any ambiguity interpreted in favor of the accused).
148. See U.N. Fact-FindingReport, supra note 1, at 77 (finding that a number of
officials, each with their own agenda, offered improper advice that led to the
implementation of Operation Murambatsvina).
149. See Int'l Crisis Group, supra note 6, at 6 (concluding that the planning of
the Operation reached the highest levels of the national government, including the
office of President Mugabe).
150. See Preparatory Comm'n for the Int'l Crim. Ct., supra note 77, art.
7(l)(d)(5) (stating that the perpetrator must know or intend the conduct to be part
of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population); see also
Cassese, supra note 73, at 373 (arguing that the mens rea requirement includes
"the awareness that the individual criminal act is part of a widespread or systematic
attack on a civilian population"). See generally Machteld Boot et al., supra note
141, at 127 (finding that the perpetrator simply needs to intend to further the attack,
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if President Mugabe did not directly order or authorize the
Operation, he would still be complicit under the aiding and abetting
provision of the Rome Statute"' because he facilitated the army in its
commission of the crime 52 as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces.' 53 Therefore, the ICC can likely assert jurisdiction over
President Mugabe for his role in Operation Murambatsvina if the
Operation satisfies the elements of a crime against humanity under
the Rome Statute.
If prosecution under Article 7(1)(d) fails, it is also possible to
prosecute President Mugabe under Article 7(l)(k), a catch-all
provision that allows the ICC to prosecute "other inhumane acts of a
similar character" that are not specified in the list of potential crimes
against humanity.'54 Although the prosecutor could likely prove that
President Mugabe, by carrying out the Operation, intentionally
inflicted great physical and mental suffering,'55 it is unlikely that the
ICC will extend the provision to include an act that logically falls
under the forcible transfer of a population provision. A broad
regardless of whether he knows all of the precise details of the plans or that his
actions rise to the level of a crime against humanity).
151. Rome Statute, supra note 10, art. 25(3)(c) (granting jurisdiction over actors
who facilitate the commission of a crime by assisting in its commission, including
providing the means for its commission); see also Kai Ambos, Individual Criminal
Responsibility, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRJMINAL COURT 475, 481 (Otto Triffierer et al. eds., 1999) (recognizing that
aiding and abetting encompasses almost any act that furthers the completion of a
crime).
152. See U.N. Fact-Finding Report, supra note 1, at 12 (stating that the
government assembled the army and the national police to carry out the operation).
153. See ZIMB. CONST. § 27.
154. Rome Statute, supra note 10, art. 7(1)(k) (stating that "other inhumane acts
of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to
body or to mental or to physical health" may constitute a crime against humanity if
carried out in accordance with the chapeau requirements); see also Askin, supra
note 80, at 49 (stating that the Court can use Article 7(l)(k) to assert jurisdiction
over persons guilty of crimes against humanity that do not fall under the other
statutory parameters of the Rome Statute). Delegates created the provision to deal
with punishable crimes which are unforeseen or unspecified. Id.
155. See Wines, supra note 26 (describing the worsening conditions for
displaced Zimbabweans); see also Conditions Worsen for Homeless Zimbabweans,
supra note 26 (chronicling the horrendous and inhumane conditions in the
government-run camps).
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interpretation of the catch-all provision is less likely because Article
22 requires strict construction of crimes and there is a general
15 6
principle that criminal statutes should be strictly construed.

1II. RECOMMENDATIONS
The international community must punish leaders who commit
internal forced displacements that needlessly result in vast human
suffering. To avoid sending a message of passive compliance to
President Mugabe and other world leaders, the U.N. Security Council
should investigate the situation in Zimbabwe and, if warranted, refer
the situation to the ICC prosecutor. If the situation is referred to the
ICC, the prosecutor should argue that the Operation falls under both
Articles 7(1)(d) and 7(1)(k) of the, Rome Statute. Finally, the HRC
and the CESCR should vocally assert that forced displacements are
not acceptable under the ICCPR and the ICESCR by openly
criticizing Zimbabwe and demanding a report regarding the
country's domestic enforcement of the Covenant rights.
A. U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBERS SHOULD REFER THE
SITUATION IN ZIMBABWE TO THE ICC PROSECUTOR AND

PLEDGE NOT TO USE THEIR VETOES WHEN VOTES
CONCERN LARGE SCALE VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS

The U.N. Security Council should investigate and, if necessary,
refer the situation in Zimbabwe to the ICC prosecutor.157 U.N.
Security Council referral of the matter would deter other States from
engaging in the forced displacement of their citizens and would
further international peace and security.158 However, it is highly

156. See Robinson, supra note 69, at 56 (commenting on the general concern of
some delegations that the ambiguous provision does not belong in a criminal law
statute). As a solution, the ICC delegation required that the acts be of similar
character. Id.
157. See supra notes 128-138 and accompanying text (arguing that the Security
Council has a duty to refer the situation under their Chapter VII powers).
158. See Aryeh Neier, Accountability for State Crimes, The Past Twenty Years
and the Next Twenty Years, 35 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 351, 352 (2003)

(recognizing that the potential of ICC prosecution deters world leaders from
committing crimes under the jurisdiction of the Court). The author goes on to
suggest that the ratification of the Rome Statute influenced President Mugabe's
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unlikely that the U.N. Security Council would refer the situation to
the ICC because multiple U.N. Security Council members have
strong political and economic incentives to block such a resolution. 5 9
The members of the U.N. Security Council should prioritize the
protection of human rights over political and economic concerns by
pledging not to use their vetoes in cases of large-scale human rights
abuses.

60

B. THE ICC PROSECUTOR SHOULD ARGUE THAT THE OPERATION
FALLS UNDER THE ROME STATUTE So THAT THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY CAN DETER AND HOLD RESPONSIBLE LEADERS
WHO ENGAGE IN MASSIVE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
If the U.N. Security Council refers the case to the ICC, the
prosecutor should argue that the Operation falls under either Article
7(l)(d) or 7(1)(k) of the Rome Statute. In reference to Article
7(l)(d), the forcible transfer of the smaller number of lawful permitholding citizens during the Operation constitutes either a
"widespread" or "systematic" attack on a civilian population. 61 This

decision to withdraw troops from the Democratic Republic of Congo. Id. at 35758.
159. See Gerhard Hafner, An Attempt to Explain the Position of the USA
Towards the ICC, 3 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 323, 324 (2005) (categorizing the official
U.S. position towards the ICC as a policy of active resistance); see also
ContemporaryPracticeof the United States Relating to InternationalLaw, 99 AM.
J. INT'L L. 691, 691-92 (John R. Crook ed., 2005) (explaining that the United
States abstained from the resolution referring the situation in Darfur to the ICC
prosecutor because of a concern for the ICC's jurisdiction over non-party States);
People's Daily Online, China, Zimbabwe Friendship Further Strengthened:
Ambassador, http://english.people.com.cn/200504/23/eng20050423_182443.html
(last visited Apr. 13, 2006) (reporting that China is the largest investor in
Zimbabwe and has a warm, friendly, and paternal relationship with the country and
President Mugabe).
160. See The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary General's High-Level
Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, 256, delivered to the General
Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004) (recognizing that the veto is an
established U.N. Security Council mechanism that can only be improved through
restrictive use, rather than complete abolishment).
161. Rome Statute, supra note 10, art. 7(l)(d); U.N. Fact-FindingReport, supra
note 1, at 58-59 (acknowledging that the government destroyed the homes and
businesses of permit-holding residents and business owners); see also Prosecutor
v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment, 579 (Sept. 2, 1998) (finding that
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argument satisfies the Article 7(2)(d) requirement that the
dispossessed citizens must be lawfully present in the area where the
deportation or forced eviction occurs. 162 Although this seems to
conflict with the principle that judges must strictly construe the
language of the Rome Statute, international courts and prominent
international legal theorists acknowledge that a smaller number of
attacks may still meet the "widespread or systematic" requirement if
the acts occur within the context of a larger attack on a civilian
population. 63 Because the meaning of "widespread or systematic" is
ambiguous, judges may look to the decisions of international courts
and other widely accepted international human rights when
interpreting the language of the Rome Statute. 164
If prosecution under Article 7(1)(d) fails, the prosecutor could
argue that Article 7(1)(k) covers not only acts not enumerated by the
Rome Statute, but also acts that logically fit within a specific
provision. Delegates, with an eye toward justice, drafted the
provision to ensure that the ICC could gain jurisdiction over crimes
against humanity that would not otherwise fall under the mandate of
the Rome Statute.165 Operation Murambatsvina would constitute a
crime against humanity under Article 7(1)(d) if the dispossessed
166
citizens held proper permits for their homes and businesses.
However, most citizens could not obtain permits because they relied
on an informal economy167 propelled by poverty,

68

colonial-era

the act need not be both widespread and systematic to rise to the level of a crime
against humanity).
162. Rome Statute, supra note 10, art. 7(2)(d).
163. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kordic, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Judgment,
57981 (Feb. 26, 2001) (finding that a single act may be considered widespread because
of the cumulative effect of a broader series of inhumane acts); see also Robinson,
supra note 69, at 48 (recognizing that an isolated act can satisfy the widespread or
systematic element if it forms part of a State policy to commit a broader attack).
164. See Rome Statute, supra note 10, art. 21 (allowing the Court to look to
international law and internationally recognized human rights norms for guidance).
165. See Askin, supra note 80, at 49 (contending that the ICC can assert
jurisdiction over unforeseen crimes against humanity under Article 7(l)(k)).
166. See supra notes 140-145 and accompanying text (arguing that the
Operation satisfies all of the elements of Article 7(1)(d) of the Rome Statute except
for the requirement that dispossessed citizens be lawfully present in the area).
167. See U.N. Fact-FindingReport, supra note 1, at 17 (recognizing that the
informal sector share of total employment grew to forty percent by 2004).
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housing laws,' 69 and government encouragement. 17 0 Therefore, the

Operation could fall under Article 7(l)(k) if prosecution under
Article 7(l)(d) fails.' 7 '
C. THE HRC AND THE CESCR SHOULD PUBLICLY CRITICIZE
ZIMBABWE FOR VIOLATING INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
COVENANTS AND DEMAND A REPORT REGARDING ITS EFFORTS
TO CARRY OUT ITS COVENANT OBLIGATIONS

The HRC and the CESCR should publicly criticize the
Zimbabwean government and request a report describing the
country's efforts to implement the rights guaranteed by the ICCPR
and ICESCR. 172 The Committees should encourage international
dialogue
regarding
forced
displacement
and
Operation
Murambatsvina in particular by distributing the reports to each other
and to other bodies within the United Nations.'73 Additionally, States
parties should publicly comment on the report and vocally criticize
the actions of President Mugabe. Finally, States within the HRC that
have recognized the authority of the Committee to hear complaints
should bring allegations that Zimbabwe is not fulfilling its treaty

168. See Preliminary Report, supra note 1, at 4-5 (concluding that the
government's negligent handling of the economy generated mass unemployment
and poverty, which corresponds directly with the increase in informal trading and
unregulated housing).
169. See U.N. Fact-Finding Report, supra note 1, at 56 (finding that the
Planning Act is a colonial-era collection of laws that sets impossibly high housing
standards to keep the majority of Africans out of the major cities).
170. See Preliminary Report, supra note 1, at 4-5 (reporting that local officials
encouraged the growth of unregulated homes and businesses because the fees
levied from the informal economic sector generated a substantial source of
income).
171. See Askin, supra note 80, at 49 (recognizing the possibility of using Article
7(1)(k) to assert jurisdiction over persons guilty of crimes against humanity that do
not fall under the statutory language of the Rome Statute).
172. See ICCPR supra note 45, art. 40(1) (noting how States parties must submit
reports upon request); see also ICESCR, supra note 44, arts. 16-17.
173. See ICCPR supra note 45, art. 40(4) (allowing for the transmission of
reports and comments to the CESCR); ICESCR, supra note 44, arts. 19, 21
(allowing for transmission of reports and recommendation to the HRC, the General
Assembly, and specialized agencies within the U.N.).
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obligations. 174 Although the reports and the complaints will have no
legal effect on Zimbabwe, the increased international dialogue will
place further pressure on President Mugabe and possibly lead to a
more meaningful discussion about the growing problem of internal
forced displacements resulting in large-scale human rights violations.

CONCLUSION
The government of Zimbabwe, under the direction of President
Mugabe, violated numerous domestic and international laws as a
result of Operation Murambatsvina. Accordingly, the government
should prosecute the parties responsible for the Operation and
provide redress to citizens deprived in violation of both domestic and
international law. Since the Zimbabwean government refuses to
carry out its legal and humanitarian obligations, the U.N. Security
Council must send a strong message against reckless internal
displacements by referring the situation to the ICC prosecutor.
Although prosecution under the Rome Statute is difficult, the
prosecutor, if the situation is referred to the ICC, should argue that
President Mugabe committed crimes against humanity under Articles
7(l)(d) and 7(l)(k) of the Rome Statute. Finally, the HRC and the
CESCR should send a clear message that internal displacements are
incompatible with their covenants by criticizing Zimbabwe and
demanding an official report describing the country's treaty
implementation. A swift and serious international response sends the
proper message that the international community will not tolerate
barbaric forced displacements that result in wanton violations of
human rights.

174. See ICCPR, supra note 45, art. 41 (stating that members recognizing the
authority of the Committee may bring complaints against other States).

